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Abstract:  Epistemically immodest agents take their own epistemic standards to be among
the most truth-conducive ones available to them. Many philosophers have argued that
immodesty is epistemically required of agents, notably because being modest entails a
problematic kind of incoherence or self-distrust. In this paper,  I argue  that modesty is
epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I focus on social contexts where agents
with limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other (like juries).
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Imagine an extremely confident businessman. He thinks he makes the best deals,
plans and decisions. When others disagree with his decisions, he simply assumes that they
are less competent than him. What would you think of him? Surely, you won’t think that he
is modest—that is, you won’t think that he is moderated in estimating his own abilities and
success. Also, you might be inclined to criticize him for lacking modesty.
Most ethicists have the same intuitive reaction. They think that immodesty is pro
tanto bad or vicious.1 Interestingly,  epistemologists  are much more inclined to think of
immodesty in positive terms. From an epistemic point of view, immodest agents take their
own standards to be among the most truth-conducive ones that are available to them. Many
epistemologists  have  argued  that  immodesty  is  epistemically  required  of  agents.
Specifically, it has been argued that maintaining standards that agents take to be suboptimal
entails  a  problematic  kind  of  incoherence  or  self-distrust.  If  agents  believe  that  other
standards are more truth-conducive than theirs, they should think that it is best for them to
revise  their  own  standards.  In  view  of  the  foregoing,  modesty  seems  epistemically
impermissible.
1 See Bommarito (2018) for an overview of this debate in ethics. See Roush (2017) on related debates in
the epistemic realm.
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In this paper, I argue that the requirement of immodesty faces a challenge in social
contexts.  Roughly,  the  argument  goes  as  follows.  We  are  fallible  agents  with  limited
cognitive capacities. One way to go beyond our limited cognitive capacities is to cooperate
with each other in epistemic groups or institutions. We trust some of these institutions more
than we trust ourselves—that is, we take the institutional standards to be more reliable than
our own individual standards. Yet these institutions are epistemically successful because we
entertain our individual standards. So, we find ourselves in an odd position: the institutional
standards  are  better  than  ours  insofar  as  we  maintain  our  own,  suboptimal  individual
standards. I argue that, in such contexts, agents are epistemically permitted to be modest. 
To  be  clear:  this  paper  belongs  to  the  field  of  “de-idealized”  epistemology  or
bounded rationality.2 As I just said, I am here concerned with fallible agents with limited
cognitive capacities. For instance, I indicate in section 2 that, if entertaining standard X is
too  cognitively  demanding  of  agents,  they  are  epistemically  permitted  not  to  entertain
standard X. So, perhaps ideal agents with unlimited cognitive capacities are required to be
immodest. My argument merely says that, when it comes to de-idealized epistemic norms,
there are counterexamples to immodesty.
1. Immodest Agents, Standards and Methods
In order to be coherent, agents ought to refrain from having some combinations of
beliefs. Incoherence can be understood in a narrow, logical sense—for instance, believing P
and disbelieving P simultaneously is logically inconsistent.3 However, incoherence captures
a broader range of combinations of beliefs—for instance, combinations of beliefs such as
“P, but it is irrational for me to believe P” or “P, but I don’t believe P” are incoherent
without necessarily displaying logical inconsistency.4 The requirement of immodesty is a
2 See Daoust (2019) on why the point I am making might not generalize to ideal agents.
3 See Broome (2013, sec. 9.2) on consistency. Some philosophers also endorse an Intra-Level Coherence
principle, which roughly states that if A believes that P1, believes that P2, ... and believes that Pn, then it is
false that A believes that ~(P1^P2 ... ^Pn). See Clarke (2013) and Leitgeb (2014a; 2014b) on Intra-Level
Coherence. However, some solutions to the Lottery Paradox entail that Intra-Level Coherence is not a
genuine requirement of epistemic rationality.  See notably Demey  (2013),  Foley  (2009) and Sturgeon
(2008). 
4 See Coates  (2012) and Lasonen-Aarnio  (2014;  2015;  2018) on epistemically akratic combinations of
beliefs.  See  also  Greco  (2014),  Horowitz  (2014a),  Kiesewetter  (2016),  Littlejohn  (2015),  Titelbaum
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requirement of coherence in the broad sense. It governs the relationship between an agent’s
possessed epistemic standards and his or her beliefs concerning such standards. 
What  does  it  mean  to  possess  an  epistemic  standard?  Li  (2016)  argues  that  a
necessary condition for possessing a standard is that there must be some sort of explanatory
connection (or at least correlation) between how agents reason and their standards. This is
the Applicability Criterion.5 Accordingly, I will assume that an agent’s possesses epistemic
standards S if S are the rules, models or assumptions he or she relies on to evaluate the
evidence (or if S are the rules he or she is  disposed to rely on).6 They act as functions
mapping an agent’s evidence onto doxastic attitudes towards P.
I take this to be a common interpretation of what it means to possess a standard.
Suppose that, when Paul comes to learn that the Chief Doctor said that P, he forms the
belief that P. Then, there is an ordinary sense in which we can say that he possesses the
standard:  “Believe  what  the  Chief  Doctor  says.”  However,  this  account  of  standard
possession is fairly weak. Some philosophers might think that there are more conditions on
possessing a standard, like fully supporting the standard, or something similar.7 Those who
endorse  a  different  account  of  standard  possession  can  conditionalize  the  rest  of  my
argument on the assumption that the weak account of standard possession is correct.8
Now, what is incoherent about modesty? It is incoherent for agents to endorse some
standards while thinking that other standards available to them are epistemically superior.
(2015) and Worsnip  (2018) for replies. See Chislenko  (2014), Huemer  (2007) and Smithies  (2012) on
moore-paradoxical combinations of beliefs.
5 Li (2016, sec. 4.2) also thinks that, in cases where a rational agent has rational standards, the theory of
standard  possession  should  explain  why  agents  ought  to  form beliefs  in  accordance  with  their  own
standards,  rather  than with  other  standards.  This  is  his  Normative  Criterion.  However,  this  criterion
primarily applies to theories of standard possession that are trying to avoid the arbitrariness objection.
The  objection  from  arbitrariness  roughly  says  that,  if  there  were  incompatible  but  (fully)  rational
epistemic standards available to agents, then they could arbitrarily switch between distinct  standards,
which seems problematic. Some authors (like Schoenfield 2014) try to avoid this objection, and endorse
something like the Normative Criterion. I will not take a stand on whether arbitrariness is epistemically
problematic. Accordingly, I here leave aside Li’s second criterion.
6 The formulation in terms of dispositions allows for performance errors (e.g., cases in which an agent has
a rule for evaluating the evidence, but does not apply it correctly). See Li (2016, sec. 6). 
7 For instance, see note 5 for discussion of an additional criterion on standard possession.
8 In any case,  even if my account  of  standard possession raises  some concerns,  we will  have learned
something interesting on whether agents should be Immodest. That is, those who wish to save Immodesty
for non-ideal agents must accept a strong interpretation to standard possession.
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After all, if one thinks that some standards are epistemically superior, one should feel some
pressure  to  take  those  standards.  Entertaining  standards  that  one  takes  to  be  less  than
optimal entails some sort of incoherence or self-distrust. In view of the foregoing, many
philosophers  think  that  legitimate epistemic  standards  are  immodest,  or  that  agents  are
epistemically required to be immodest.9 Relatedly, many recent philosophical arguments
presuppose that agents are epistemically required to be immodest.10
Different definitions of immodesty have been offered. The most popular version
goes as follows:
Immodesty (initial).  Relative to their evidence, agents take their own doxastic states (i.e.
beliefs and credences) to be the most accurate ones and they take their own epistemic
standards to be the most truth-conducive ones.11
Here is the one I favour:
Immodesty.  Relative to their  evidence,  agents take their  own epistemic standards to  be
among the most truth-conducive ones that are available to them.
First,  as  indicated  earlier,  I  here  focus  on  epistemic  standards.  I  leave  aside
immodesty  for  doxastic  states.  Surely,  there  is  something  wrong with  combinations  of
beliefs such as: “I believe P, but believing ~P would be more accurate.” However, we can
9 Lewis  (1971,  56) (and  Elga  2010) suggests  that  modest  methods or  standards cannot  be completely
trusted,  and  thus  display  a  kind  of  internal  failure.  See  also  Hedden  (2015),  Horowitz  (2014b) and
Schoenfield  (2014).  Other  philosophers  reject  immodesty.  Christensen  (2013) argues  that  epistemic
modesty  can  be  permitted  in  cases  where  various  epistemic  ideals  (e.g.,  ideals  of  coherence,  good
reasoning and evidence-responsiveness) conflict with each other. Relatedly, DiPaolo (2018) argues that,
in non-ideal contexts where various epistemic norms conflict with each other, modesty can be part of an
epistemic  second-best  (e.g.,  the  best  non-ideal  option  available  to  agents).  Belot  (2013) addresses  a
related problem in a Bayesian context. Roughly, Belot doubts that agents should be immodest in cases
where it is almost certain that no method or standard is accurate. See Weatherson (2015) for discussion.
Mayo-Wilson  and  Wheeler  (2016) argue  that,  in  order  to  accommodate  scoring  rules  for  imprecise
credences, immodesty ought to be replaced with a weaker principle. 
10 Hedden  (2015,  720–21) argues that  the fundamental  facts  about  evidential  support  must  be  a  priori.
According to him, the immodesty criterion provides support for objectivism, because immodest methods
treat  themselves  as  empirically  indefeasible.  Horowitz  (2014b) argues  that  immodesty  precludes
permissivism,  the  view  roughly  stating  that,  relative  to  a  body  of  evidence  agents  are  sometimes
permitted to entertain distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P. By way of contrast, Schoenfield
(2014) also  thinks  that  immodesty  is  correct,  but  argues  that  it  is  compatible  with  interpersonal
permissivism. See Li (2016, 9–10) for a reply to Schoenfield’s argument.
11 As in Lewis (1971, 55) and Schoenfield (2014, 201–2), notably. We could also specify what “most truth-
conducive” means exactly. For instance, we could assign an epistemic value T to having a true belief in P
and an epistemic disvalue F to having a false belief in P, and say that most truth-conducive standards
maximize epistemic value (or expected epistemic value). But there is no need to be that specific here.
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explain why such combinations of beliefs are problematic or prohibited without referring to
Immodesty. If one thinks that believing ~P would be more accurate than believing P, one
thinks that P is false. So, being modest concerning one’s doxastic states roughly amounts to
having Moore-paradoxical beliefs, such as “P is false, but I believe P.”12 Thinkers with such
beliefs  seem to  contradict  themselves.  Thus,  agents  who believe  P  while  thinking  that
believing ~P would be more accurate violate other requirements than Immodesty (such as
requirements prohibiting Moore-paradoxical beliefs).
By way of  contrast,  thinking that  one’s  standards  are  less  truth-conducive  than
others does not amount to having Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Agent might know that their
standards are suboptimal without also knowing which of their  beliefs are less accurate.
Suppose you and I have the same evidence. We take a test on our beliefs in {P1, P2..., Pn}
and are informed of the results. I got 80% on the test, while you got 90%. Provided that I
trust the results, this is good evidence that your standards are more truth-conducive than
mine. Still, all I know is that you have a better ratio of true to false beliefs in {P 1, P2..., Pn}.
I don’t know what you believe. So, I might continue believing that each particular answer I
gave on the test is the most accurate one—that is, I won’t come to the conclusion that my
belief that Pi is less accurate than believing ~Pi. In view of the foregoing, thinking that
one’s standards are suboptimal can’t be reduced to having Moore-paradoxical beliefs. At
first sight, modesty concerning epistemic standards doesn’t seem reducible to other types of
incoherence.
Second,  against  David  Lewis,  I  here  assume  that  immodest  agents  take  their
standards  to  be  among the  most truth-conducive  ones (and  not  to  be  the  most truth-
conducive ones). Here is why. Lewis offers the following argument against modesty:
Suppose you did trust some non-immodest method. By definition, it estimates
some competing method to be more accurate than itself. So if you really did
trust your original method, you should take its advice and transfer your trust to
one of the competing methods it recommends. It  is as if  Consumer Bulletin
were to advise you that Consumer Reports was a best buy whereas Consumer
12 Objection: if one thinks that  believing ~P is more accurate than believing P, one does not necessarily
believe  that  P  is  false.  One could  simply think  that  ~P is  more  likely  than  P.  Reply:  one  then  has
combinations of beliefs such as “~P is more likely than P, but I believe P.” This combination of beliefs is
Moore-paradoxical in spirit (Hájek 2007). 
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Bulletin itself  was  not  acceptable;  you  could  not  possibly  trust  Consumer
Bulletin completely thereafter. (Lewis 1971, 56)
According to  Lewis,  modesty  and non-immodesty  are  the  same thing,  and agents  who
entertain non-immodest standards estimate that other standards are more truth-conducive.
However, this doesn’t entail that immodest agents take their standards to be the most truth-
conducive ones. Immodest agents can estimate that there is more than one optimal set of
standards. In other words, there could be distinct but equally optimal standards available to
agents.13 So, the argument put forth by Lewis merely entails that  agents should take their
standards to be part of the best ones available.
Compare: Buridan’s ass is facing two equally good stacks of hay (and he knows
they are equally good). Standard Left says “choose the stack of hay on the left,” while
standard  Right  says  “choose  the  stack  of  hay  on the  right.”  Suppose  he  is  practically
immodest—say,  he  thinks  that  the  decisions  resulting  from his  practical  standards  are
among the best ones available. Yet, his standards do not necessarily preclude the possibility
that other standards are equally optimal. Buridan’s ass can entertain standard Left while
thinking that standard Right is also optimal. In fact, given what he knows, Buridan’s ass is
fully aware that both standards are equally optimal. Thus, Immodesty should be neutral on
whether optimal options are uniquely determined or not.
Third, following Horowitz (2014b, 43), I here assume that optimality is relative to
the options available to agents. Surely, agents can believe that other standards or methods
are  more  truth-conducive  than  theirs,  such  as  “ignore  misleading  evidence.”  However,
agents are not always in a position to know when the evidence is misleading. So, they can’t
take such a standard because it is unavailable to them. Yet agents can be immodest with
respect to the standards available to them.14 So, Immodesty should be limited to standards
that agents can, in fact, satisfy.
13 See Daoust and Montminy (m.s.) for more details.
14 Relatedly, an agent’s evidence can constrain the standards available to him or her. Information scientists
can learn how to design better algorithms to process the data. Thus, after acquiring new evidence, some
better standards will become available to them. Lewis (1971, 55) makes similar remarks.
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One  final  remark:  My  objection  against  Immodesty  relies  on  full  beliefs  (and
standards  governing  their  formation  and  revision).  Most  philosophers  interested  in
Immodesty are concerned with credences, not full beliefs. Accordingly, one might object
that Immodesty is a coherence requirement for credences, not for full beliefs, and so that I
am missing the target. I don’t think that’s right. If the argument put forth by Lewis were
conclusive,  it  would  not  merely  apply  to  credences.  His  argument  roughly  states  that
thinking that one’s doxastic states are suboptimal entails a problematic kind of incoherence.
The argument doesn’t presuppose that “doxastic states” means credences. In other words,
the fact that Lewis was thinking of credences has no bearing on the argument. If Lewis’s
argument succeeds, Immodesty should govern full beliefs as well.
2. Should Agents be Immodest? Social Contexts and Opaque Standards
I will now cast doubt on the claim that agents should be immodest—that is, agents
are sometimes epistemically permitted to entertain epistemic standards that they take to be
less truth-conducive than other available ones. I believe that important objections against
Immodesty come from the way epistemic institutions work.  Accordingly,  my argument
against Immodesty will rely on the division of epistemic labour in some social contexts. It
runs as follows:
P1.  In  social  contexts,  the  individual  standards  entertained  by  agents  can  give  rise  to
available but opaque metastandards.
P2. Such opaque metastandards can be more truth-conducive than the individual standards
entertained by agents.
P3. If P1 and P2 are correct, then Immodesty is not epistemically required.
C. So, Immodesty is not epistemically required.
2.1. Defending P1
I will give an example of a social context in which agents with individual standards
can cooperate with each other and give rise to an available but opaque metastandard. An
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opaque standard is one that agents find difficult to internalize. Yet the standard can be
available, in the sense that agents can rely on it to evaluate the evidence (think of artificial
neural networks: we can rely on them to shed light on a problem, but it is difficult to know
how they work).
Agents  like  us  have  limited  cognitive  capacities  and  don’t  reason  perfectly.
Accordingly, when it comes to making decisions on complex problems, agents must spend
a lot of time and energy to think about the various moving parts of the problem and are
prone to errors. In an epistemic community, an efficient way to overcome these challenges
is to cooperate with each other. This can take many forms. For instance, agents can divide
the epistemic labour of collecting evidence,  reasoning, and drawing conclusions among
members  of  an  epistemic  community.  Agents  can  also  act  as  epistemic  safeguards  for
reliable  knowledge  (think  of  mechanisms  such  as  peer  review—an  editor  might  ask
different referees to review a paper, so that their biases are counterbalanced).
Juries are among the most familiar cooperation mechanisms. During complex trials,
a  single juror is  likely to overestimate (or underestimate) the evidence for believing P.
However,  different  jurors  with  different  standards  of  reasoning  working  together  can
minimize such overestimation (or underestimation) biases. Hence, this kind of mechanism
can be beneficial in view of making the right decisions.
With these remarks in mind, consider the following case:
Permanent  Jury.  A  jury  composed  of  99  agents  is  formed  for  several  trials.  Agent  1
entertains  standard  1,  agent  2  entertains  standard  2,  and  so  forth.  The  individual
standards entertained by the jurors are distinct and incompatible with each other.15 Given
the  evidence  the  jurors  acquire  during  the  trials,  they  ought  to  determine  if  the
defendants are guilty. The trials are subject to three rules. First, all jurors are presented
with the same evidence and they ought to vote on the basis of the shared evidence only.
Second,  the jurors do not discuss with each other  before or after  casting their  vote.
Third, the jurors are faced with a binary choice (such as “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”).
In Permanent  Jury,  the group under simple majority  gives rise to  a  metastandard.  In  a
nutshell, the metastandard says that, relative to a body of evidence, one should believe P (or
~P) if and only if a majority of individual standards recommend believing P (or ~P). Since
15 See Titelbaum and Kopec (forthcoming, 14) on distinct, incompatible epistemic standards.
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those standards are entertained by jurors, the metastandard could also be formulated as
follows: relative to a body of evidence, if a majority of jurors vote for P, one should believe
P,  and if  a  majority  of jurors vote for  ~P, one should disbelieve P.  This  metastandard
supervenes on the standards entertained by each individual juror, which partly confirms
P1.16
Assume that jurors know the standards entertained by each other. Accordingly, the
jurors could reconstruct the metastandard and internalize it. Still, it would be difficult for
them to internalize it.  For instance, suppose a juror needs five minutes to determine if,
relative to a body of evidence, an individual standard supports the conclusion that P. Now,
since there are 99 individual standards, it would take a juror 495 minutes (and too much
mental  energy)  to  determine  what  the  metastandard  supports.  So,  the  metastandard  is
opaque because it is difficult for agents to internalize it. Thus, P1 is true.
2.2. Defending P2
P2 follows from well-known results in collective judgment aggregation. 
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem roughly states that, when equally reliable voters make a
choice between two outcomes (such as “guilty” and “not guilty”), the majority rule can lead
them to make collective decisions “with a competence that approaches 1 (infallibility) as
either the size of the group or the individual competence goes up” (Estlund 1994, 131). A
consequence of the Theorem is that a group of jurors under simple majority outperforms the
individual competence of each juror.17 Both conclusions are correct if three conditions are
satisfied. First, the probability that juror i gets the right answer (Pri) satisfies the following:
0.5<Pri<1 and Pr1=Pr2...=Pr99. Second, the probability that a juror gets the right answer is
independent of the probability of any other juror getting the right answer. Third, the jurors
are faced with a binary choice (such as “Guilty” and “Not guilty”).
The Theorem can be used in favour of P2. Suppose that, in Permanent Jury, the
members of the jury are told by a trustworthy informant that each of them reaches the right
16 See Daoust (2019).
17 See Condorcet (1976 [1785]).
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answer 90% of the time (and assume this is a fact). The jurors are familiar with Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem (it was part of their jury training). They know that the Theorem’s conditions
stated above are satisfied.18 So, they can deduce that the jury is more reliable than each
individual juror. Specifically, they can deduce that the jury under simple majority reaches
the right answer ≈99.99% of the time. Since 99.99%>90%, the metastandard is more truth-
conducive than the non-opaque standards available to agents. This confirms P2.
2.3. Defending P3
I will now argue that, in cases where P1 and P2 are satisfied, members of a jury are
permitted to be modest (e.g., they can entertain an epistemic standard while thinking that a
better standard is available to them). 
When the jury’s verdict is revealed, jurors can update their beliefs on this new piece
of  information.  This  is  so,  because  jurors  take  the  jury  to  be  more  reliable  than  each
individual juror. So, if they come to know that the jury reached the conclusion that P, they
may defer to the jury and believe P. For some jurors, this will mean changing their belief
concerning P.
Note that this is not necessarily a sign of modesty. Agents need not to be modest in
order to defer to juries. Jurors can treat the jury as an “expert”, and deferring to experts can
be immodest. Compare: if a doctor runs various tests and comes to a conclusion about your
health, deferring to him or her can be part of your optimal epistemic standards.
Now, suppose there is a sufficiently long period of time between (i) the moment
when jurors cast their votes and (ii) the moment when the verdict is publicly revealed. In
the meantime (i.e.,  between jurors voting and jurors coming to know the verdict),  what
should jurors do? During this period of time, jurors are not in a position to defer to the
verdict,  because  it  has  not  been  revealed  publicly.  Yet,  they  could  work out  what  the
18 The first condition is satisfied, since all the jurors reach the right answer 90% of the time. The remaining
two  conditions  are  mentioned  in  the  description  of  Permanent  Jury.  It  could  be  argued  that  the
independence condition is merely satisfied in part since agents have the same evidence. In response to
such a worry, we could use a relaxed independence condition that is compatible with the fact that voters
have the same evidence (such as  Dietrich and List’s  (2004,  182) Independence  Given  the Evidence
condition  or  Dietrich  and  Spiekermann’s  (2013,  sect.  4) New  Independence  condition).  This  small
adjustment would not affect my argument. For simplicity, I ignore this complication here.
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collective judgment will be. They know the standards entertained by their colleagues on the
jury, and they share all the relevant evidence. So, they could guess what the result will be.
If  jurors  processed the evidence through 99 different  standards  and determined what  a
majority  of standards  supports,  they would come to know the final  verdict  before it  is
publicly revealed.
The fact that jurors can do this puts them in a puzzling position. Suppose Nicolas is
a juror in Permanent Jury. Given what I have said previously, he is in a position to conclude
that the metastandard is more reliable than his own individual standards. Indeed, if Nicolas
estimates that the other jurors reach the right answer more than ~55% of the time, he should
also think that the metastandard is more reliable than his.19 As I indicated in section 2.2,
Nicolas is told by a trustworthy informant that the jurors reach the right answer at least 90%
of the time. Moreover, it is a fact that each juror reaches the right answer 90% of the time.
So, Nicolas is in a position to know that other jurors are minimally reliable, and he can’t
reasonably conclude that his individual standards are among the most truth-conducive ones
available—in fact, he should come to know that his individual standards are suboptimal.
After realizing that their individual standards are suboptimal, jurors like Nicolas can
react in three different ways:
(i) They can go skeptical and cease entertaining their standards;
(ii) They can maintain their individual standards and be modest;
(iii) They can internalize the metastandard.
(i) would have bad consequences. Going skeptical means that Nicolas loses fairly
reliable  individual  standards.  Also,  recall  that  the  metastandard  supervenes  on  the
individual  standards  entertained by the  jurors.  So,  if  the  jurors  cease entertaining  their
individual standards, they can’t form a functional jury with a highly reliable metastandard.
For these reasons, (i) is a bad option.
(iii) is too demanding, since the metastandard is opaque. Jurors know each other’s
individual  standards.  So,  internalizing  the  metastandard  would  be  possible,  but  very
19 This is a consequence of familiar probability rules.
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demanding. Jurors like Nicolas would have to mediate the evidence through 99 standards
before  being  in  a  position  to  know what  the  metastandard  recommends.  Their  mental
economy would greatly suffer from internalizing the metastandard.  Hence,  (iii) is not a
good option.
In view of the foregoing, it is more appropriate for jurors like Nicolas to maintain
their  individual  standards.  This  leaves  us  with  (ii).  Following  this  option,  Nicolas  is
contributing to the metastandard by entertaining his individual standards. He knows that,
since jurors like him entertain fairly reliable standards, the group under simple majority is
highly reliable. This institutional arrangement is advantageous to everyone and adapted to
the  non-ideal  capacities  of  the  jurors.  These  considerations  can  motivate  Nicolas  to
maintain standards that he knows to be suboptimal. In view of the foregoing, (ii) seems like
the best option.
Yet,  this  means  that  Nicolas  should  be  modest.  For  instance,  while  Nicolas
maintains his individual standards, he defers to the group’s verdicts when they conflict with
his own conclusions. This is so, because he takes the group’s verdict to be better than his
own. Relatedly, if someone asks Nicolas which standard is epistemically optimal, Nicolas
will  respond: “the metastandard is more reliable than the standards I entertain.” This is
precisely what a modest agent would respond. 
Jurors  like  Nicolas  find  themselves  in  an  odd position:  the  metastandard  exists
because jurors maintain their own, suboptimal individual standards. Note, however, that
this odd result is somehow expected. Indeed, a reason why agents form juries is precisely to
give rise to such better standards. This arrangement allows them to achieve more than they
could  achieve  individually.  As  Buchak  and  Pettit  indicate,  “when  people  organize
themselves as a group agent, they generally do so with a view to achieving purposes that
are unavailable to them individually”  (Buchak and Pettit 2015, 220). In other words, the
jurors want to give rise to a standard that is better than theirs, without necessarily being
able (or wanting) to internalize such a standard. In such a context, it should come at no
surprise that jurors are modest. Reliable institutions like juries come at the price of modest
jurors. The trade-off is worth it.
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In sum, since (ii) is the most reasonable option, a juror like Nicolas is permitted to
be modest. Given his limited capacities and the opacity of the metastandard, being modest
seems like the appropriate stand to take towards his own standards. Of course, if we were
concerned with ideal agents who have unlimited cognitive capacities, the problem would
solve itself. But we are not, and this is why non-ideal agents are permitted to be modest.
2.4. What Is the Social Dimension of the Argument?
One could object that my argument has nothing to do with the division of epistemic
labour  in  social  institutions.  It  merely  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  internalizing  some
standards is too demanding, and agents are epistemically permitted not to take standards
that are too demanding. So, the social aspect of the problem is irrelevant: the reason why
Nicolas is epistemically permitted not to take the metastandard is that this would be too
demanding.
My response  to  this  worry  is  that,  if  Nicolas  were  not  taking  part  in  a  social
institution like a jury, there would be more reasons for him to take the most truth-conducive
standards available to him. To see why, consider the following case:
Desert Island. Nicolas is on a desert island. He wonders whether P. In order to determine
whether P is the case, two belief-forming methods are available to him, namely, A and
B. Method A is 99% reliable, but mentally taxing. It would take Nicolas one week to
process the evidence with A, which would affect his mental economy. By contrast, B is
a fast and frugal heuristic. It would take him 10 seconds to process the evidence with
method B. Yet this method is 90% reliable.
There is an important difference between the jury case and Desert Island. In a social
context  like  a  jury,  Nicolas  knows  that,  after  some  time,  he  will  know  what  the
metastandard  supports.  The jury’s  verdict  will  be known publicly after  some time.  So,
Nicolas can believe in accordance with the maximally reliable belief-forming method. He
simply  has  to  wait until  the  verdict  is  publicly  revealed.  This  is  why internalizing  the
metastandard would be such a waste of his time and mental resources.
However, on Desert Island, Nicolas doesn’t have the option to wait until he knows
what the most reliable standard supports. On Desert Island, the only way to know what the
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most reliable belief-forming method (A) supports is to process the evidence with such a
method. So, when one is on a desert island and one wants to believe in accordance with the
most truth-conducive standards, one has to process the evidence through the most truth-
conducive standards. In other words, in Desert Island, Nicolas has no easy and efficient
way to believe in accordance with the most truth-conducive methods available to him. This
puts more pressure on agents in Desert Island to process the evidence in accordance with
the most truth-conducive standards.
This  is  why social  contexts matter.  Communities  can be highly reliable  without
forcing  individuals  in  such  communities  to  entertain  the  maximally  reliable  standards
available to them. By contrast,  isolated individuals do not have this option.  Hence,  the
division of epistemic labour in social institutions matters.20
Here is another way to put it. There are putative objections against Immodesty that
have nothing to do with social mechanisms. For instance, some philosophers have argued
that we should make a distinction between the epistemically required and the epistemically
supererogatory  (Jackson forthcoming, 5–7; Li 2017).  Suppose agents ought  to  entertain
sufficiently reliable standards, but not maximally reliable standards. Accordingly, agents
could  believe  that  their  own standards  are  suboptimal  because they merely do what  is
required of them. They could know that better standards are available to them, but since
they do not want to be epistemic  heroes, they nevertheless choose to maintain standards
they take to be suboptimal. 
This  tentative  objection  against  Immodesty  is  relevant.  Yet,  some  epistemic
consequentialists  could  offer  the  following  reply:  “Epistemic  norms  aim  at  optimizing
truth-conduciveness. If you want to optimize your ratio of true to false beliefs, you have to
be an epistemic hero.  There is  no way around it.”  I  think that  a  social  perspective on
epistemic norms allow us to see why this kind of reply is mistaken. In social contexts, we
can  optimize  truth-conduciveness  without  taking  over-demanding  individual  standards.
Jurors have access to an undemanding method for optimizing collective reliability. In other
20 I thank a referee for inviting me to discuss this objection.
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words, truth-conducive social mechanisms alleviate the pressure agents face to be epistemic
heroes. 
2.5. The Objection From Insincerity
Here is an objection to my argument. After realizing that their individual standards
are suboptimal, jurors like Nicolas can go skeptical and cease entertaining their standards. I
have argued that this would have bad consequences, since the jury cannot function if jurors
lack individual standards. 
One could reply that this is not necessarily a bad option. The jury could function
even if jurors do not entertain their own individual standards. For instance, jurors could
vote insincerely. Specifically, perhaps jurors should refrain from having their individual
standards, but vote in accordance with these standards (e.g., vote as if they entertained their
individual standards). This way, the jury would function properly while the jurors do not
entertain their own individual standards. Call this the objection from insincerity.21
There could be contexts in which some types of insincerity can be epistemically
permitted. Fleisher  (2019),  for  instance,  has  argued that  scientists  can publicly endorse
ideas that they do not fully believe. Even if they have a low degree of confidence in their
own theories,  they  can  make a  significant  contribution  to  the  advancement  of  science.
Similarly, it is understandable that lawyers sometimes defend their clients while thinking
they are guilty. Part of their job is to make the best case for their client, and sincerity is not
required for this. 
In view of the foregoing, it  seems plausible that,  on some occasions, agents are
epistemically permitted to be insincere. I do not challenge this. My contention is that (i)
21 The objection from insincerity is a natural  option for those who endorse strong accounts of standard
possession. In section 1, I said that an agent possesses epistemic standards S if S are the rules, models or
assumptions he or she relies on to evaluate the evidence. This is a weak account of standard possession.
Some  philosophers  might  think  that  there  are  more  conditions  on  possessing  standards,  like  fully
supporting them. Relative to this stronger account of standard possession, we can see how juries can be
perfectly functional without being sincere. All jurors need to do is to reduce their degree of support in the
standards they use to evaluate the evidence. This way, they stop possessing their standards (because they
do not fully support them anymore), but the jury is still perfectly functional (because jurors still process
the evidence with these standards). I acknowledge that, relative to a strong interpretation of standard
possession, this escape route is available to defenders of the Immodesty requirement. But as I have said
earlier, I am here concerned with a weak interpretation of standard possession.
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insincerity is not always an available option, and (ii) even when being insincere is part of
one’s options, one sometimes fall under an obligation to be sincere.
In  order  to  lend  support  to  (i),  I’ll  first  make  some  brief  remarks  on  familiar
problems in ethics. They will help us see in what sense insincere voting is not always an
option. 
Suppose a trolley is moving towards five people. Anna stands next to a lever. She
could pull the lever and divert the trolley onto the sidetrack, where it will kill 2 people. So,
Anna has two options. First, she could do nothing and let five people die, and second, she
could pull the lever and kill two people. However, one could suggest that Anna has more
options. One could say: “Anna could alert the people on the tracks. If they hear her, they
will move, and everybody will be saved!” However, this option is not always  available.
Perhaps Anna is mute, or perhaps the agents are tied to the track, and so forth. So, there will
be cases in which, given the facts of the situation, Anna only has the two options mentioned
above.
In a similar spirit,  agents do not always have the option to vote insincerely. For
instance, most courts expect jurors to be sincere, and give explicit instructions to jurors on
sincerity. Such instructions could restrict the range of options available to jurors (e.g., they
exclude insincerity). Now, you might objects that, even if jurors are  asked to be sincere,
they could lie and vote insincerely. However, some institutions could go a step further and
make sure that there is no leeway between beliefs and votes. Consider the following case:
Implant. Carole is part of a special type of jury. All the jurors received a brain implant. At
the end of the trial, Carol’s implant records her beliefs that result from her evidence and
standards. So if, at the end of the trial, her evidence and standards leads her to believing
that Smith is guilty, it records “Smith is guilty.” The implants communicate with each
other and determine the jury’s verdict. That is, rather than being a consequence of jurors
casting  their  votes,  the  jury’s  verdict  follows  from  the  beliefs  recorded  by  all  the
implants. This way, the verdict is guaranteed to be sincere.
In Implant, the institution doesn’t let Carole vote insincerely. The collective verdict results
directly from her beliefs, and so she can’t vote in a way that conflicts with her beliefs.
Given the facts of the situation, she can’t have standards X but vote in accordance with
standards Y. This confirms (i): insincerity is not always an option.
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What about (ii)? In many collective contexts,  sincerity is part of why we  trust an
institution. When reliable jurors vote in accordance with their evidence and standards, we
can easily make sense of the verdict.  This allow us to trust the institution and defer to its
verdicts. However, insincerity could generate distrust, and undermine the jury’s initial goal,
namely, to improve collective reliability. Consider the following case:
Trial. Twelve jurors have to determine if the defendant is guilty. As it happens, given their
evidence and standards, none of them believe that he is guilty (and the judge told them
that, in such a case, they should vote for “the defendant is not guilty”). However, none
of them vote in accordance with their individual standards. All the jurors end up voting,
in accordance with different standards, for “the defendant is guilty.” When asked if they
are satisfied with the verdict, the jurors say: “Well, none of us thought he did it. But this
doesn’t matter, and we found him guilty.”
Cases like Trial are problematic. Communities could easily distrust the jury’s verdict if they
came to  learn  that,  while  none of  the  jurors  believe  that  the  defendant  is  guilty,  they
unanimously voted for “the defendant is guilty.” The verdict would not make sense to the
community.  Part  of  why we form juries  and other  institutions  is  to  improve collective
reliability.  However,  insincerity  can,  in  some  contexts,  be  an  obstacle  to  collective
reliability.  If  communities  end up not  trusting  juries  composed of  insincere  jurors,  the
purpose  of  these  institutions  is  defeated.  This  suggests  that,  at  least  in  contexts  where
insincerity leads to distrust, jurors fall under an obligation to be sincere.
To  be  clear:  Insincerity  doesn’t  always  lead  to  distrust.  As  I  have  said  at  the
beginning of this section, lawyers sometimes defend their clients while believing they are
guilty. We know full well this happens. This doesn’t necessarily lead us to distrust legal
proceedings Perhaps we merely expect lawyers to make the best possible case for their
clients.  My point  is  merely that,  in  some contexts,  insincerity  can lead to  distrust.  For
instance, we could easily distrust insincere members of a jury. On such occasions, agents
can fall under an epistemic obligation to be sincere.
3. Discussion: Ideal and Non-Ideal Epistemic Norms
I  have  argued  that  non-ideal  agents  are  sometimes  permitted  to  be  modest.
However, I have left it open whether ideal agents should be immodest. In this section, I
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give the beginning of an answer to the question of why some epistemic norms might apply
to ideal agents, but not to non-ideal agents. Specifically, I argue that there could be leeway
between epistemic norms for ideal and non-ideal agents, and that there is no obvious reason
why we should approximate ideal epistemic norms.
Some philosophers think that there is some sort of connection between ideal and
non-ideal  theories.  A  popular  suggestion  is  that  non-ideal  norms  consist  in  an
approximation of  ideals.22 According  to  such  a  view,  we  ought  to  approximate  ideal
epistemic figures to a certain degree. Typically, it is assumed that ideal epistemic figures
are fully coherent, have an excellent ratio of true to false beliefs, reason perfectly, have
unlimited cognitive capacities, and so forth.23 
If this view concerning the approximation of ideals is right, it is unclear why non-
ideal agents can be modest while ideal agents cannot. Suppose ideal agents are immodest
(say, because modesty is incoherent, and coherence is part of the epistemic ideal). Then,
why not think that we ought to approximate the ideal epistemic figures, and fall under an
obligation to be immodest?24
It is still unclear why agents like us, who cannot reach the epistemic ideal due to
various (legitimate) constraints, should approximate it. Approximations claims have failed
in  other  fields,  and  we  have  good  reason  to  think  that  the  lesson  also  applies  in
epistemology.
22 Staffel (2017) calls such a view the Imitation Thesis. Smithies (2015) endorses a similar view. See also
Christensen  (2004, chap. 6), Morton  (2012, chap. 1), Pasnau  (2013) or Talbott  (2016, sec. 6.1.A) for
discussion in various contexts. 
23 See Christensen (2004, chap. 6), DiPaolo (2018), Earman (1992, 56), Paul and Quiggin (2018), Smithies
(2015), Staffel (2017; forthcoming), and Talbott (2016, sec. 6.1.A) on the recourse to epistemic ideals. De
Bona  and  Staffel  (2018) argue  that  non-ideal  agents  should  approximate  some ideal  coherence
requirements, but this is compatible with thinking that non-ideal agents should not approximate  all the
ideal epistemic norms. In general, it is unclear what counts as an “ideal.” See, for instance, Gaus (2016,
chaps.  1–2) on this issue. Still,  most  philosophers agree upon some examples of ideal and non-ideal
epistemic theories. For example, Bayesian epistemology (Joyce 1998; Pettigrew 2016) is often thought of
as an idealized theory, whereas theories of bounded cognition and heuristics (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002;
Kahneman 2003; Todd and Gigerenzer 2000) are often thought of as non-ideal theories.
24 It should be noted that it is not clear what “approximating an ideal” means. Suppose an ideal is defined in
terms of the optimal value of some variables x1,  x2,...,  xn.  Then, approximating the ideal can refer to
getting as close as possible to the optimal values of x1, x2,..., xn. However, suppose an ideal is defined in
terms of the features or states of affairs of an ideal world. Then, approximating the ideal can refer to
meeting as many features of the ideal world as possible. These interpretations of approximation claims
can conflict with each other.
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Consider the General Theory of the Second Best, a formal contribution to the field
of  utility  (or  welfare)  optimization.  The Theory  analyzes  the  relationship  between  two
optima:  an  optimal  option relative to  minimal  constraints  (the first-best  option)  and an
optimal option relative to a set of additional constraints (the second-best option). As Lipsey
and Lancaster say:
Perhaps the best  way to approach the problem of defining the scope of the
theory of second best is to consider the role of constraints in economic theory....
in the theory of the Paretian optimum, certain constraints are assumed to be
operative and the conditions necessary for the maximization of some function
subject to these constraints are examined. In the theory of second best there is
admitted  at  least  one  constraint  additional  to  the  ones  existing  in  Paretian
optimum theory and it  is in the nature of this constraint that it  prevents the
satisfaction of  at  least  one of the Paretian optimum conditions.  (Lipsey and
Lancaster 1956, 12)
The General Theory of the Second Best is well known for suggesting that second-
best options are not a mere approximation of first-best options. The formal result relies on
an application of the Lagrange multiplier method, which  is used for finding a function’s
optima  subject  to  some  constraints. For  present  purposes,  there  is  no  need  to  be  that
specific.  Here is a simple example. Suppose that, in the ideal market, there are no tariffs,
because free markets optimize production. Now, suppose that nearly every country applies
tariffs, but one country decides to adopt a free trade policy. There is a sense in which this
action brings the world closer to the ideal of a free market. But does this action improve the
global production? Not necessarily. In view of the global allocation of the resources, this
action can be suboptimal. (Ozga 1955, 499) As Lipsey and Lancaster note:
[assume] that all commodities are, in consumption, rigidly complementary, so
that their production either increases or decreases simultaneously... [then] in a
three country world with tariffs all around, one country may adopt a policy of
free  trade  and,  as  a  result,  the  world  production  of  all  commodities  may
decrease. (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, 14)
So, the first-best scenario involves free trade for all countries, but the second-best scenario
can  involve  tariffs  in  every  country.  A  country  adopting  a  free  trade  policy  would
approximate the ideal world (e.g., meet more of the economic relationships defining the
ideal world), but such a policy can nevertheless be suboptimal.
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Wiens  have  noted  that  this  general  lesson could  also  apply  in  other  normative
disciplines. He says: 
The theory of second best is more general than is conventionally thought. As
economists  recognized  from  the  start,  the  original  theorem  is  not  about
economic theory and welfare policy per se but is instead about mathematical
optimization  in  general....  Once  we  distinguish  between  the  mathematical
model  and  associated  theorem on  the  one  hand  and  the  familiar  economic
interpretation of the model on the other, we clear the way for developing novel
applications of the theorem. (Wiens forthcoming, 2)
In other words, the formal result underlying the Theory can be interpreted in many different
ways, including epistemological ones. So, those who think that we ought to approximate
ideal  epistemic  figures  need  to  tell  us  why  second-best  problems  do  not  arise  in
epistemology. A priori, there is no reason to think second-best problems cannot arise for
epistemic norms.25
Another argument against the approximation of ideals has to do with the role of
compensatory mechanisms in non-ideal scenarios. Ideal theory doesn’t say much about how
to compensate for our mistakes or imperfections, because agents in ideal worlds are perfect.
This is why, for instance, ideal political theories often have little to say about just war.
There are no wars in perfect political  communities.  The doctrine of just  war is  closely
related to non-ideal theories, and is meant to compensate for the imperfections of political
interactions.26
Compensatory mechanisms can  explain why we should not  always approximate
ideals.  Suppose that the ideal world has the following two attributes: (i) people never get
sick  and (ii)  there  are  no hospitals.  This  makes  sense,  because  hospitals  are  useless  if
people never get sick. Now, suppose that such an ideal world is unavailable, but that such
worlds are available: 
Option 1. (i-) some people get sick and (ii) there are no hospitals.
Option 2. (i-) some people get sick and (ii-) there are hospitals.
25 Wiens (forthcoming, sec. 3) also specifies the conditions in which second-best problems can be observed.
26 See,  e.g.,  Walzer’s  (2015) afterword,  where  he  discusses  just  wars  and  nonviolent  ways  to  resolve
military conflicts.
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Surely, if people get sick in this world, we want hospitals in this world. So, Option 2 is
more  valuable  than  Option  1.  However,  while  Option  1 and the  ideal  world have  one
attribute in common (there are no hospitals), Option 2 and the ideal world have no attribute
in common. As we can see, it would be absurd to claim that Option 1 is the best available
option just because it is a better approximation of the ideal world.27 This is explained by the
fact that,  in non-ideal worlds,  we need to  compensate for our imperfections:  in  worlds
where agents get sick, it is optimal for them to have recourse to compensatory mechanisms
such as hospitals.
In a similar spirit, the “modest” division of epistemic labour in social institutions
like juries  could be a compensatory mechanism for agents like us. Suppose ideal agents
have  infinite  cognitive  capacities.  So,  internalizing  epistemic  standards  cannot  be
cognitively demanding to them. By way of contrast, we are non-ideal agents with limited
cognitive capacities, and internalizing some epistemic standards can be demanding to us.
Forming  juries  and  other  social  institutions  can  compensate  for  our  imperfections:  by
working together, we compensate for our limited cognitive capacities. This even leads us,
on some occasions, to trust these institutions more than we trust ourselves—that is,  we
sometimes  take  the  institutional  standards  to  be more  reliable  than  our  own individual
standards.  And this could explain why modesty is epistemically permitted for agents like
us, but not for ideal agents.
These brief remarks do not prove out of doubt that approximation claims are false.
But they give us a sense of why there could be some independence between ideal and non-
ideal epistemic norms. In other words, it is a live possibility that non-ideal epistemic norms
do not merely consist in an approximation of ideal ones.
4. Conclusion
Many philosophers think that immodesty is epistemically required of agents. I have
argued that modesty is epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I have focused on
social contexts where agents with  limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other
27 Assuming, of course, that approximation is interpreted in terms of shared features. See footnote 24.
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(like juries). I have also provided a tentative explanation of why approximating putative
ideal epistemic norms (like Immodesty) might be suboptimal for agents like us.
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